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ABSTRACT
Transfer occurs when something is learned under particular circumstances and is
applied in a new, somehow different, situation. This paper will argue that fuzzy-trace
theory can be used to explain the process of transfer. The advantage of fuzzy-trace theory
is found in a dual-process theory of memory. Fuzzy-trace theory explains a broad range
of phenomena and has the strength to conquer the elusive problem of transfer.
Trace-cue compatibility theory is a theory of memory retrieval. By combining the
trace-cue compatibility theory with fuzzy-trace theory, we get a method for treating both
memory storage and memory retrieval. This combination provides a powerful
mechanism for understanding the results of classic experiments on transfer.
We can explain transfer in terms of particular forms of memory being cued by an
event. In many cases, the cued memory is an analog for the target item. When the target
analog has been mapped onto the appropriate memory trace, transfer can occur.
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1) Introduction
The main goal of this thesis is to show that fuzzy-trace theory provides a
framework for solving the elusive problem of transfer. Transfer occurs when something
is learned under particular circumstances and is applied in a new, somehow different,
situation. Fuzzy-trace theory is an empirically based psychological theory on human
memory and learning. It has been suggested that fuzzy-trace theory can be used to
understand transfer.1 This thesis takes the work done by Wolfe, Reyna, and Brainerd,
connects it to other psychological theories, and applies the resulting framework to the
problem of transfer. This approach will strengthen the argument that fuzzy-trace theory
deserves a place in the mechanism of transfer.
We will combine the trace-cue compatibility theory with fuzzy-trace theory.
Trace-cue compatibility theory covers memory retrieval. This combination gives us a
method for treating both memory storage and memory retrieval. With help from tracecue compatibility theory and other research on analogies, fuzzy-trace theory provides a
powerful mechanism for understanding the results of classic experiments on transfer.

Wolfe, Christopher R., Valerie F. Reyna, and Charles J. Brainerd. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory: Implications in
Teaching and Learning.” In Transfer of Learning From a Modern Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by
Jose P. Mestre. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2005.
1
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2) What Is Fuzzy-Trace Theory?
Fuzzy-trace theory is a psychological theory of memory. Specifically, fuzzy-trace
theory models the interaction between memory and higher order processes. 1 It makes a
number of claims that deviate sharply from traditional models. We will now survey the
specific claims made by this theory.
Fuzzy-trace theory claims there are two independently functioning types of
memory in the human mind. These are called gist memory and verbatim memory. This
position is referred to as dual-process because of the two independent processes for
memory. One of the founders of fuzzy-trace theory described memory as being “of two
minds - minds that are not well integrated with each other, neither when memories of
experience are first stored nor when they are subsequently retrieved.”2 Empirical
evidence supports the dual-process position and the evidence will reveal itself throughout
this document.
Verbatim traces represent the superficial and particular characteristics of an item.
Gist traces are representations of logical, linguistic, relational, and meaning-based
information.3 Gist memory supports a fuzzy and intuitive form of reasoning. Gist is the
basis of pattern recognition. Typically, the formation of generalizations and the ability to
recognize similarity require the usage of gist traces. Verbatim memory, on the other
Brainerd, C. J. and V. F. Reyna. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory.” Current Directions in
Psychological Science 11 (2002), 164.
1

Brainerd, C. J. and V. F. Reyna. The Science of False Memory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press
(2005), 87.
2

3

Brainerd and Reyna (2005), 84.
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hand, is about details. Verbatim traces are rich in detail and tend to be context-specific.
For example, suppose a person sees a computer. Information about the shape, color, and
size of the computer would normally be stored in verbatim memory. Information about
the general functions of the computer would be stored in gist memory.
One of the most distinctive tenets of this dual-process approach is that both forms
of memory are stored in parallel. They are, for the most part, stored simultaneously and
processed independently. Gist and verbatim retrieval are dissociated from one another.
Verbatim traces are generally used for recall. They store the surface features of a
particular item that were directly observed during an event.1 Gist traces are generally
used for reasoning and store interpretations of concepts formed about an event or an item.
So while these two types of memory may be stored at the same time, they are typically
retrieved separately depending on the task at hand.
Another difference between gist and verbatim traces is their relative stability over
time. Verbatim traces are affected by retroactive interference.2 Retroactive interference
often results in people remembering the details of an event differently than they were at
the time the memory was formed (encoded). This results in a faster rate of forgetting.
For example, you remember that a person has green eyes. If you subsequently observe
several people with blue eyes, the green eye memory could now be stored (incorrectly) as
a blue eye memory.

1

Brainerd and Reyna (2002), 165.

Brainerd, C. J. and V. F. Reyna. “Memory Independence and Memory Interference in Cognitive
Development.” Psychological Review 100 (1993), 46.
2
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Surface details are typically not maintained in memory for extensive periods of
time. Verbatim memory is initially stored more readily because it represents the actual
input data of the surface features of an experienced item. 1 Gist memory requires
additional processing and is therefore more difficult to store initially.2 The advantage to
gist lies in being stored as a semantic form of memory.3 Semantic memory refers to
meaning content and is maintained for longer periods of time. Thus, there is a trade off
between ease of storage and stability of storage. An important consequence of the
instability of verbatim memory is that it fades in time.
Gist memory accounts for the strength of human rationality. The word ‘fuzzy’
hints at the detail deficient nature of gist traces. As they age, people use more intuition
and less surface detail for problem solving. Children prefer to use quantitative reasoning.
Older children and adults prefer a more qualitative method and have a ‘fuzzy-processing
preference.’ 4 Fuzzy-processing is a synonym for gist-processing. Despite being more
intuitive, adults have greater accuracy in reasoning. Without so many verbatim details
filling working memory, adults process information much more efficiently. Difficult
solutions to very abstract problems can result from this intuitive processing. Precision

Brainerd, C. J. and L. L. Gordon. “Development of Verbatim and Gist Memory for Numbers.”
Developmental Psychology 30 (1994), 166.
1

2

Brainerd and Gordon (1994), 166.

3

Brainerd and Reyna (1993), 46.

Reyna, V. F. and Susan C. Ellis. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Framing Effects in Children’s Risky decision
Making.” Psychological Science 5 (1994), 276.
4
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details are needed to solve some problems, but that seems to be the exception. It is the
patterns of inputs that are needed for rationality, not their verbatim forms.1
From here on, we will focus on applications and connections to other theories.
Fuzzy-trace theory fits well with other prominent psychological research. The first
section connects fuzzy-trace to a theory of memory retrieval. The next section applies
fuzzy-trace theory to the problem of transfer. The final section contrasts fuzzy-trace
theory with traditional accounts of transfer experiments.

3) Memory Storage And Retrieval
Encoding-retrieval match occurs when a cue is similar to a memory. For
example, a piano might remind you of what you know about playing music. The
standard encoding-retrieval view would explain this by appealing to the fact that the cue
and the memory are very similar.2 Although this is a plausible view, it has limitations.
The trace-cue compatibility theory places the emphasis elsewhere with better results.
Nairne has argued that memory-cue similarity may correlate with, but does not
cause a match. He describes remembering as a discrimination process. The cues in a
situation act as criteria for accessing the relevant memory. The primary inhibitory effect
is ‘cue overload.’ Cue overload occurs when a cue has been associated with multiple
memory traces. When this occurs, the cue is unable to identify the specific trace that is

1

Brainerd and Gordon, 163.

2

Nairne, James S. “The Myth of the Encoding-Retrieval Match.” Memory 10 (2002): 389-395.
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relevant.1 A particular cue could be highly similar to a particular memory trace, but if it
is associated with many other memories, a match will be difficult. Furthermore, a cue
could be dissimilar to a memory but still match if they have been related in some way.
Nairne suggests using ‘relative match’ as opposed to a simple similarity-based match.
Relative match is how much a cue uniquely specifies an event.2 The cue may or may not
be similar to the event that it matches. For example, you see a car and it somehow brings
a chimpanzee to mind. This kind of match is certainly possible but it could not be
explained based on similarity. The car might uniquely specify the chimp for a reason
other than similarity.
Fuzzy-trace theory claims that verbatim and gist memories can be formed in
parallel at the same time. The two memory traces will therefore be very similar and a cue
could easily match both memories. Yet, verbatim access is favored when retrieval cues
match the surface content of a target memory. Gist access is favored when the cue
matches the meaning content of a target memory.3 This is where relative match comes in
handy. Verbatim representations contain surface content, so they will have the greatest
relative match to cues for surface content. Gist representations contain meaning content,
so they will have the greatest relative match to cues for meaning content. Being similar
to the cue might be related to a particular memory being accessed, but only because
having the greatest relative match uniquely specifies the appropriate memory trace.
1

Nairne (2002), 390.

2

Nairne (2002), 392.

3

Brainerd and Reyna (2005), 89.
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Nairne conducted an experiment where subjects were provided one unique cue,
two unique cues, or one shared and one unique cue for a target.1 Although adding a
second cue increased the similarity between the cue and target, the extra cue actually
decreased success rates for recall tasks when it was a shared cue. If the extra cue did not
uniquely specify a target, it reduced performance in comparison to a single unique cue.
Not surprisingly, subjects given two unique cues performed best on recall tasks. When
the similarity between cue and target increases, recall performance tends to also increase.
However, the similarity is not causing the improved performance. In some cases,
increasing the similarity decreases recall performance. Cues that uniquely specify the
correct memory enable correct responses, not the degree of similarity between the cue
and trace.2
Trace-cue compatibility is a theory of memory retrieval. Fuzzy-trace is a theory
of memory storage and function. Fuzzy-trace research has resulted in some data about
cues. These results are supportive of Nairne’s account of trace-cue compatibility. When
these two theories are combined, we get the backbone of a complete theory of memory
storage and retrieval.
It was important to quickly establish the relationship between cues and traces. We
will now switch gears to discuss the main topic of this thesis. The paper will now focus
on the application of fuzzy-trace theory to the problem of transfer.
Nairne, James S. “The Functionalist Agenda in Memory Research.” In Experimental Cognitive
Psychology and its Applications, edited by Alice F. Healy. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association (2005), 122.
1

2

Nairne (2005), 122.

Massey, M. Ryan, 2007, UMSL, p. 12

4) A Close Look At Transfer
Transfer occurs when a concept or skill is learned in one situation and is then
applied to a new, somehow different, situation. If pressed, we could find twenty or so
definitions and descriptions of transfer.1 A successful theory of transfer has been difficult
to find but we continue looking because it is an important area of educational psychology.
Corporations are interested in training people for work. Schools are interested in
teaching students in classrooms. People are expected to take what they learn in seminars
or classrooms and apply this knowledge to a variety of situations. Researchers hope to
find an underlying mechanism of transfer.
Historically, there have been many takes on transfer. We will look closely at two
that stand out. One position claims that transfer is essentially not possible. The other
position claims that transfer requires a huge ‘knowledge base.’ After looking at these two
possibilities, we will contrast these views with an explanation provided by fuzzy-trace
theory. Wolfe, Reyna, and Brainerd have previously applied fuzzy-trace theory to the
problem of transfer2. We will combine fuzzy-trace theory with the trace-cue
compatibility theory. If successful, this approach will give us a better mechanism for
understanding transfer. We will use this method for evaluating the traditional theories of
transfer.

Haskell, Robert E. Transfer of Learning: Cognition, Instruction, and Reasoning. San Diego, CA:
Academic Press (2001), 29-32.
1

2

Wolfe, Reyna, and Brainerd (2005).

Massey, M. Ryan, 2007, UMSL, p. 13

4.1) Is Transfer Extremely Limited?
In the introduction to Douglas Detterman’s critique of transfer research, he makes
a bold claim: “if people seldom transfer skills and if they cannot be taught to transfer,
then transfer can have no importance as an explanation of individual differences in
everyday behavior.”1 Detterman believes that transfer rarely occurs. His claim goes to
the heart of the transfer debate and it should be evaluated. First, seldom transfer is not
the same thing as no transfer at all. Secondly, Detterman does not show convincingly
that people cannot be taught to transfer. We will call Detterman’s position the extremely
limited theory (ELT for short) because this theory claims that transfer is extremely
limited.
Detterman typically is focused on ‘general transfer.’ General transfer occurs
when a generalized skill or concept is applied across varied situations. This is the
strongest form of transfer that researchers take seriously. Historically, there have been
numerous studies claiming to demonstrate evidence for general transfer.
Judd showed that subjects could transfer an understanding of refraction to the task
of hitting underwater targets. Young boys who were taught the principles of refraction
were able to transfer these principles to hitting targets at various depths under water. For
a more complete description of this experiment, see section 5.2 of this paper. The

Detterman, Douglas K. “The Case for the Prosecution: Transfer as an Epiphenomenon.” In Transfer on
Trial: Intelligence, Cognition, and Instruction, edited by Douglas K. Detterman and Robert J. Sternberg.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation (1993), 4.
1
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important thing here is that the students were told that refraction was applicable to the
underwater target task. Detterman dismisses Judd’s experiments as demonstrating that
subjects can follow instructions.1 In another case, young children were taught the skill of
stacking. They applied this principle to solve several different problems. Detterman sees
this as rule induction and not as transfer. However, it isn’t clear from his objection that
rule induction is unrelated to transfer. Detterman concludes that most transfer studies
either explicitly tell the subjects about an analogous solution or use a “trick” to cause
them to notice that a solution they already know may apply to the current problem. 2
ELT’s first major conclusion is that people rarely transfer skills or concepts from one
situation to another. Therefore, transfer is not a big factor in describing human behavior.
ELT’s second major conclusion stems from the claim that transfer is an
“epiphenomenon.”3 It can be safely assumed that the phenomenon of transfer consists of
more basic processes. These underlying processes theoretically represent the direct
causal factors in human behavior. In that sense, transfer will not provide any
fundamental explanations. The second conclusion avoids the problem of transfer by
suggesting we study learning in a more fundamental way. If transfer is merely a
byproduct of other processes, Detterman suggests we should focus our attention on these
lower level processes.

1

Detterman, 9.

2

Detterman, 13.

3

Detterman, 19.
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We could apply this epiphenomenon argument to most of the topics in the field of
psychology. This would put us on a continual search for more basic processes. We
would eventually discuss neurotransmitters and that conversation would not explain
human ability either. For example, Parkinson’s disease has been linked to the lack of a
specific neurotransmitter (dopamine) in the mid brain.1 An understanding of the basic
processes does not contain all the information about Parkinson’s disease. The symptoms
of Parkinson’s disease are an effect of the deficiency of dopamine in certain processes in
the brain. The symptoms are nevertheless important to understand for the sake of
diagnosing the condition. The higher order symptoms should be studied along with the
fundamental processes.
Returning to transfer, the epiphenomenon argument does not settle the issue at
hand. If the process of transfer consists of more basic processes, we can’t be certain there
are no important details at other levels of description. Furthermore, while it is plausible
that psychological theories might contain ever more fundamental explanations leading
down to the physics of psychology, we cannot be certain of this. If we are uncertain that
psychology can be reduced in this way, we should not expect our psychological theories
to reduce. Jerry Fodor has argued we can use science to study the world without
appealing to fundamental laws.2 By demanding that our theories contain fundamental

1
2

Restak, Richard. Brainscapes. New York, NY: Hyperion (1995), 53.

Fodor, Jerry. “Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese 28
(1974), 77-115.
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explanations, we could exclude the very thing we are trying to explain. So let’s return to
ELT’s claim that transfer is not important in human behavior.
If people can transfer a skill or concept to a new situation by simply instructing
them to do so, this supports the view that transfer is teachable and suggests that transfer
could be common. By telling subjects that previously learned concepts are applicable to
a new situation, they were given a cue to consider certain concepts stored in memory. To
understand any new pattern, problem, analogy, metaphor, relation, or inference, we would
always expect people to have some sort of cue to recall prior memories. Whether this cue
originates in the subject, the experimenter, or the external environment is of little
consequence to the process of transfer. The content of the cue is important, not the
origin. We should not expect people to spontaneously transfer concepts any more than
we should expect them to self-generate cues for the retrieval of memory representations
perfectly suited to the task at hand. So let’s proceed with the assumption that people
might be good at transfer when provided the correct memory cues.
For memory retrieval, experienced items are better retrieval cues for verbatim
traces than non-experienced items. Non-experienced items that comprise the meaning
content of an experience are better retrieval cues for gist traces.1 Transfer falls under the
second category. The skill of transfer does not involve experiencing the same item we
have seen before and remembering something about it. Transfer involves experiencing
something new that has an analogous meaning to an event we have experienced before.

1

Brainerd and Reyna (2002), 165.
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When subjects are told to apply a previously learned skill to a new situation, this does not
cue the retrieval of verbatim memory. Instructions to apply prior knowledge to a new
situation will cue gist memory. Gist memory alone can provide the underlying meaning
needed for transfer. Without clear retrieval cues, the subjects could have retrieved
unhelpful verbatim traces or have been confused by the dissimilar surface features
between the prior and current situations. For example, a stool looks and feels differently
than a couch, but they are both used for sitting. A person who has never seen a couch
might not know its purpose. If someone tells them to apply what they know about stools
to the couch, they might see the underlying analogy. It would be difficult to achieve this
based on comparing the surface details of the two seats.
ELT has not made a strong case against transfer. Fuzzy-trace theory has shown
some promise for explaining when and why transfer is possible. Before going further
with this approach, we will consider the work of Haskell and his view of transfer.

4.2) Does Transfer Require a Huge Knowledge Base?
Robert Haskell claims, “the essential problem in transfer is when and how
something is perceived as being the same as or equivalent to something else.”1 He
believes the solution to this problem lies in having a huge knowledge base. Knowledge
base is defined by Haskell as the quantity and organization of the knowledge possessed
by a person. Knowledge is acquired in many ways such as reading, experience, listening,

1

Haskell, 26.
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observing, and thinking. Haskell claims that a large knowledge base is “the absolute
requirement not only for transfer but for thinking and reasoning.”1 For example, expert
chess players don’t have superior brains; they simply know more about chess. Since
knowledge is stored in memory, we can assume that Haskell is suggesting that people
need a huge number of memories, organized in the right way, to support transfer of skill.
From here on, I will refer to this as the HKB argument.
The HKB position further contends a large knowledge base also improves our
pattern recognition ability.2 To notice a regularity between two situations, people require
a large number of organized memories. The more memory we have about various
situations, the more likely we are to notice similarities between them.
The next big claim of the HKB argument concerns the storage of memory. The
claim is that people with a large knowledge base retrieve memories and transfer
knowledge better than people with less knowledge. 3 The knowledge base results in
superior memory function, not the other way around. Once again, Haskell supports this
claim by pointing out that chess experts have no better memory ability than chess
novices; they simply know more about chess.
In summary, the HKB argument suggests that a large knowledge base will result
in (1) an increased ability to perceive analogies, (2) superior memory encoding and
retrieval, and (3) the ability to transfer as a result of (1) and (2).
1

Haskell, 96.

2

Haskell, 108.

3

Haskell, 109.
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To evaluate claim (1), we need a theory of analogies. Fortunately, a clear and
general explanation of analogies already exists. A relevant analog must be retrieved from
memory. This analog must be compared to the target and similarities must be identified.
This process is known as ‘mapping.’ The target is mapped onto a familiar analog. This
allows analogical inferences to be made about the target and often results in new
knowledge.1
Thus, it is not a large number of memories that is needed, but relevant memories.
It is very plausible that a large number of memories will increase the chances that a
person will have the relevant memories for a particular analogy. This new claim would
need to be empirically tested. Nevertheless, HKB seems compatible with the findings
from analogy research.
Claim 2 is not supported by fuzzy-trace theory. This research has shown that
precise memories do not correlate with accurate reasoning. 2 Even if a large knowledge
base results in superior encoding, this does not provide a mechanism for transfer. Precise
encoding is not needed for gist reasoning and is therefore not needed for transfer. A large
knowledge base full of detail rich memories could actually hurt reasoning. Memory-toreasoning interference occurs when surface features cue verbatim memories in a situation
where gist memory is needed. Interference affects children more frequently than adults.
When children are provided the background inputs for a reasoning problem, they have a
Gentner, Dedre and Keith J. Holyoak. “Reasoning and Learning by Analogy.” American Psychologist 52
(1997), 33.
1

Reyna, V. F. and Barbara Kiernan. “Children’s Memory and Metaphorical Interpretation.” Metaphor and
Symbolic Activity 10 (1995), 314.
2
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tendency to only consider how the inputs bear on solving the problem. This inhibits their
abilities when the problem involves transfer because background inputs do not contain
inferences. Without further cues, this results in low performance. 3 The following
paragraph will explain this in more detail.
Transfer is a reasoning task. Research has shown that reasoning ability is largely
independent of storing a great deal of memory.2 In one experiment, children were told a
short story about the number of various animals a farmer owns.3 Remembering the actual
numerical values was not correlated with being able to correctly answer reasoning
questions. Suppose the children were told “Farmer Brown has 2 pigs, 3 ducks, and 4
chickens.” When later asked if there are more pigs or chickens, the correctness of their
response was independent of whether the children could remember how many of each
animal there are. The child may have inferred something relational about these
background inputs and stored this in gist memory. Thus, reasoning tasks only require a
relatively small amount of gist knowledge. Correctly answering reasoning questions does
not rely on the encoding of precise verbatim memory.
Accurate reasoning does not require the storage of huge amounts of knowledge.
HKB could be reformulated to suggest that people with a large number of gist memories
are good at a broad number of reasoning tasks. However, it is not the large amount of

1

Brainerd and Reyna (1993), 52.

Reyna, V. F. “How People Make Decisions that Involve Risk: A Dual-Processes Approach.” Current
Directions in Psychological Science 13 (2004), 62.
2

3

Brainerd and Gordon, 171.
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knowledge that is needed. Transferring a skill requires a limited number of gist
memories well suited for that particular task. The amount of other memories is irrelevant
to a particular transfer task and in some cases could hurt transfer by causing interference.
HKB would need to show that having a large knowledge base results in having relevant
gist memories for transfer and that these effects are not negated by interference. An
alternate possibility is that as we age, people acquire a larger knowledge base and more
gist memories for reasoning/transfer. Gist memory would be correlated with a large
knowledge base, but not be caused by it.
Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that gist memory for reasoning can exist
independently of the knowledge base size. Of course, adding these gist traces will
increase the knowledge base to some extent. The point here is that a large knowledge
base will do nothing for your ability to transfer unless it contains useful gist memory. It
is the gist memory that explains transfer, not the large knowledge base.

4.3) Fuzzy-Trace Theory’s Take on Transfer
The key to transfer is not getting distracted by simple surface details of the
problem. To apply the same lesson across multiple problems, people must compare
underlying similarity.1 This takes place using gist reasoning.

Wolfe, Christopher R., Valerie F. Reyna, and Charles J. Brainerd. “Fuzzy-Trace Theory: Implications in
Teaching and Learning.” In Transfer of Learning From a Modern Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by
Jose P. Mestre. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing (2005), 59.
1
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Contrary to Detterman’s claim, we can teach people to transfer. In order to teach
transfer, teachers must emphasize gist reasoning and find ways to cue gist memories
under appropriate conditions. Experiments have supported the views of fuzzy-trace
theory. For example, consider a study on learning geologic time scales.1 Participants
were split into groups. One group was asked to study geologic time lines using a rote
memory strategy. Another group was asked to generate analogies for the time line. This
could play out in many different ways. For example, when magma cools it becomes
rock. Analogously, when water cools it becomes ice. A student could use this analogy to
remember that magma was present on the surface of the Earth before the current state of
rock. The analogy group was better at placing the events on a time line. The rote
memory group was more accurate in matching an age to a given event. This study
provided evidence that rote memory improves verbatim memory and that analogical
reasoning improves gist memory. Increases in one did not correlate with increases in the
other. Gist and verbatim traces are independent. Subjects that were good at the time line
task were typically not good at the recall task and vice versa.
In light of the preceding sections, we may conclude that transfer depends on how
well we learn gist and how well it is cued. Gist is needed for transfer because it enables
us to see the underlying similarity between contexts in spite of dissimilar surface
features.2 Surface features can confuse a person or cue unhelpful verbatim

1

Wolfe, 65.

2

Wolfe, 83.
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representations. Under these conditions, transfer will not be possible. If, on the other
hand, a person has been trained to link surface cues to the appropriate gist memories,
transfer will be possible.
The previous section has dealt with contemporary theories used to explain
transfer. We will now look at more traditional views.

5) A Fuzzy Take on Two Classic Experiments
Many classic experiments on learning have been analyzed in terms of the
abstractness or concreteness of the knowledge. Edward Thorndike claimed that two
situations must have concrete identical elements between them for transfer to occur.
Charles Judd claimed that people can transfer on the basis of abstract generalizations. In
this section, we will look at the traditional understanding of these experiments and try to
shed new light with fuzzy-trace theory.

5.1) Rethinking Identical Elements
Edward Thorndike conducted a long series of psychology experiments in the early
twentieth century. In one example, subjects were asked to estimate the area of various
rectangles. The subjects were taught to do this by using comparison rectangles with
given areas. Even with over 1,000 trials of training, errors remained very high. After
some increases in skill with rectangles, subjects were unable to transfer this ability to
estimate the area of other shapes like circles or triangles. Thorndike found “no
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relationship between how well subjects did on one square and how well they did on the
next.”1
Thorndike’s conclusion is simple. Transfer is very difficult to achieve. These
experiments supported the conclusion that transfer requires a set of ‘concrete identical
elements’ between two situations or events.2 Simply put, for someone to learn something
in one situation and apply it to a new situation, there must be at least some part or parts of
the new situation that exactly replicate the initial conditions. In 1901 terms, when a
person is stimulated by an identical concrete element, they respond by applying a learned
skill.
There are reasons to look elsewhere for a theory of transfer. These concrete
identical elements do not seem to capture all transfer events. For example, learning
mathematics and applying it to science. It isn’t clear how Thorndike would explain this.
Furthermore, in his rectangle experiment, there were concrete identical elements between
the rectangles and subjects still failed to transfer. Thorndike’s results demonstrate
something about human learning, but not how people succeed at transfer.
The fuzzy-trace theory tells a different story. Repeating the same training trial
over and over is a rote memory strategy. Contemporary evidence suggests rote
memorization results in strong verbatim representations. Just as importantly, rote
memorization also leads to weaker gist representations. 3 Verbatim traces are cued by
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surface content while gist traces are cued by meaning content.1 As previously noted,
analogical reasoning requires gist memory. To transfer a skill, an analog from memory
must be mapped to the transfer target.2
Thorndike trained his subjects in a way that developed strong verbatim
representations. These representations are great when you are trying to remember very
specific information in a context-specific way. However, the training inhibited the
subjects from forming gist representations. Rote memory did not allow subjects to form
the kind of analogies needed for gist memory. When properly cued, these memories
could have helped the subjects notice the analogy between the shapes they learned and
the areas they were asked to estimate. Thorndike chose to focus on the concrete features
of the learning conditions and the transfer conditions. He noticed that his subjects were
not using any abstract reasoning and their only successes occurred by using concrete
representations. Fuzzy-trace theory can explain why subjects typically failed to transfer
and it makes a prediction.
If the participants were taught analogies relating the two situations and were cued
to use those analogies, they would have succeeded. Specifically, if participants were
cued to use the rectangle area memories that are also relevant to finding circle areas, they
would have been demonstrating transfer. Analogies help people notice when one
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memory is useful in more than one application. Verbatim traces inhibit this process by
obscuring the bigger picture.

5.2) Rethinking Abstract Generalizations
In 1908, Charles Judd provided an experiment, that seriously challenged
Thorndike’s theory. The results suggest that transfer can occur by way of an underlying
abstract general principle.1 Judd asked young boys to throw darts at underwater targets.
He then split them into two groups and they performed indistinguishably during the first
trial. Initially, the targets were twelve inches under water. One group was provided
additional training. They were told how light is refracted by water and that this
information might be useful for hitting targets.2 When the depth was changed to four
inches and later to eight inches, the refraction group quickly adjusted. By understanding
refraction, these boys were able to perform effectively in a new situation.3 The control
group learned by practice only. The boys without an understanding of refraction
struggled anew each time the depth changed.
Judd concluded that the group with refraction training was able to generalize a
principle and apply it to a new situation. Simply put, these boys used an abstract
understanding to solve a problem. Framed in this way, the conclusion raises many
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questions and is controversial. Just as Thorndike compared two situations based on
concrete elements, Judd compared two situations on the basis of underlying abstract
similarity. Thorndike’s view is that if there are enough concrete similarities, transfer of
skill can occur. Judd’s view is that if there are enough abstract similarities, transfer of
skill can occur. This has caused a long-standing and seemingly irresolvable debate. How
similar do the situations need to be? Is abstract transfer different than concrete transfer?
Do people actually use both types of understandings to solve problems? Is one more
important in problem solving? Did Thorndike actually show that transfer is limited? Did
Judd actually show that transfer is possible? And so on.
Just as fuzzy-trace theory gave us a clearer picture of Thorndike’s research, it can
also help us with Judd. For the boys hitting targets under water, it might not have been
obvious to them that a lesson on refraction had anything to do with their task. At first
glance, light bending in water and darts moving through water to hit a target may seem
unrelated. However, the boys were able to apply what they had learned to the problem.
Both groups discovered that hitting targets underwater is challenging. Only the
group with an understanding of refraction understood why it is challenging. Based on
their training, the boys learned the underlying meaning of the problem and they were
encouraged to notice the relationship between refraction and target-hitting problems
involving various depths of water. This is an example where “intuitive, fuzzy, gist-based
thinking facilitates bridging across contexts that differ in verbatim detail.”1 The boys

1

Wolfe, 83.

Massey, M. Ryan, 2007, UMSL, p. 28
were trained in a way that created gist representations in memory. In order to cue these
representations, the boys were told that they would be useful to the problem of hitting
under water targets. The boys formed gist representations, they were properly cued, and
they used gist reasoning to solve a problem by connecting two seemingly unrelated
concepts.
5.3) Concluding Remarks
Fuzzy-trace theory has given us something new to think about. Analyzing the
concrete elements did not provide a complete picture of transfer. Judd’s abstract
generalizations did not provide a mechanism in support of his theory. Fuzzy-trace theory
gives us a plausible mechanism that explains the results of these classic transfer
experiments

6) General Conclusions
Fuzzy-trace theory explains a broad range of phenomena. It has the strength to
conquer the elusive problem of transfer and provides a mechanism for understanding
some classic experiments in psychology. Its strength is found in a dual-process theory of
memory. Gist and verbatim traces provide a critical element for understanding human
rationality. We can understand transfer in terms of gist and verbatim traces being cued by
an event. In many cases, the cued memory is an analog for the target item. When the
target analog has been mapped onto the appropriate gist or verbatim trace, transfer can
occur.
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